Taiwan’s “Great Recall” Fails: DPP’s Mass Petition Drive Falls Short, Leaving Legislative Balance Unchanged
The phrase “Taiwan 大罢免,” usually rendered in English as “the great recall” or “the major recall in Taiwan,” captures both the mechanics of a legislative recall and the sheer scale of the campaign that has dominated the island’s political discourse over the past year. In Mandarin, 罢免 (bàmiǎn) means “recall,” while 大 (dà) adds a sense of magnitude—a “large‑scale” or “great” effort. What began as a series of citizen‑initiated petitions has evolved into what observers are calling the largest recall wave in Taiwan’s modern history, targeting dozens of lawmakers from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and, to a lesser extent, officials from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and even the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) itself.

23 August 2025
The recall drive emerged in the wake of the 2024 general election, which left the DPP without a majority in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT and the TPP quickly forged a working alliance that allowed them to push through a slate of bills, prompting the DPP and a coalition of civic groups to mount a counter‑offensive. Their stated aim was to “protect national security and democracy” by ousting legislators they accused of blockading the DPP’s agenda and, in DPP‑led rhetoric, of being “pro‑China” or “selling out Taiwan.” The campaign was framed as a defensive measure, but it also served as a potent political weapon, seeking to erode the opposition’s foothold and possibly restore a DPP‑led majority.
The numbers illustrate the ambition of the effort. Early 2025 saw citizen groups file 19 recall proposals for legislators and one for a county or city mayor, including a bid to remove the KMT‑affiliated mayor of Hsinchu, Kao Hung‑an, a former TPP figure. By July, the first wave of voting—dubbed the “first round of the great recall”—took place on July 26. Voters were asked to decide the fate of 24 KMT lawmakers and the Hsinchu mayor. All 24 legislative recall petitions failed, as did the mayoral challenge, marking a clear defeat for the DPP‑backed initiative.
Undeterred, organizers pressed on, filing a second batch of recall proposals aimed at seven additional KMT legislators. The second round of votes, held on August 23, 2025, produced the same outcome: none of the recall petitions met the threshold required to remove the incumbents. The twin failures—first in July and then in August—have turned what DPP officials advertised as a “massive” campaign into what many commentators now describe as a political drama that has done little to alter the balance of power in the legislature.
The social media response has been equally telling. cynicism and, in some quarters, overt nationalist sentiment. Posts repeatedly lament the “political theatrics” that dominate Taiwan’s public life, with phrases such as “真的很悲哀,每天都在搞这些,有的没的,只会转移焦点,然后正事不做” (“It’s really sad—every day they’re doing this and that, only shifting focus and never getting any real work done”). Many frame the recall attempts as a “farce” (闹剧) that has ended in “complete failure,” while others invoke a broader pro‑China narrative, sharing videos of Japanese nationals holding Chinese flags in Taiwan and proclaiming love for China. The undercurrent of Chinese nationalism is evident not only in these symbolic gestures but also in the use of hashtags like #台湾加油,罢免国民党 (“Go Taiwan, recall the KMT”) and #大罢免大成功 (“Great recall, great success”), the latter often employed sarcastically after each failed vote.
Scholars watching the episode note that the unprecedented breadth of the recall effort reflects a new form of voter accountability, one that seeks to reshape not just individual careers but the entire factional landscape of the Legislative Yuan. Yet the practical impact remains limited: despite a flood of petitions, overseas Taiwanese communities joining the cause from Japan, and a flurry of TikTok videos dissecting the stakes, the electorate has so far rejected every recall attempt.
The implications for Taiwan’s “blue‑green‑white” political configuration are significant. With the DPP’s recall strategy stalled, the party must now contend with a legislature where the KMT and TPP continue to collaborate, a reality that may force the DPP to look beyond attention of external observers, including U.S. policymakers who monitor cross‑strait tensions, and it has highlighted how internal partisan battles can intersect with broader geopolitical concerns.
In short, the “great recall” that captured headlines across the island and in diaspora circles has, for now, reaffirmed the resilience of Taiwan’s democratic mechanisms. While the DPP’s bid to overturn opposition seats through mass petitions has faltered, the public debate it triggered—replete with frustration, nationalist overtones and a keen awareness of the limits of political maneuvering—offers a vivid snapshot of a society wrestling with its democratic identity amid deep partisan divisions and ever‑present external pressures.