China to Revive “Great Spirit of Resistance” as Xi Leads 2025 80th‑Anniversary WWII Commemorations
By the time the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japanese aggression rolls around on September 3, 2025, the nation will be once again awash in ceremonies, speeches and school lessons devoted to what President Xi Jinping repeatedly calls the “great spirit of resistance.” The phrase—rendered in Chinese as 伟大抗战精神—has become a cornerstone of the current Chinese leadership’s narrative about the war that ended with Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, and about the country’s broader project of national rejuvenation.
2 September 2025
Xi has been foregrounding that spirit ever since he assumed the top post at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. In a series of addresses, visits to historic battlefields and observations of memorials, he has urged officials, teachers and ordinary citizens to “tell the stories of the Anti‑Japanese War well” and to ensure the legacy is “passed down from generation to generation.” While the language is deliberately evocative, the core of the message boils down to three interlocking ideas that Xi repeats with ritual precision. First is a patriotic sentiment captured in the old maxim 天下兴亡、匹夫有责—“the rise and fall of the nation is the responsibility of every citizen.” Second is a declaration of national integrity, 视死如归、宁死不屈—“facing death bravely and never surrendering.” Third is a heroic resolve, 不畏强暴、血战到底—“not fearing tyranny and fighting to the end.” By weaving these three strands together, Xi frames the wartime struggle as a moral compass for contemporary China.
The narrative is not just abstract. Xi’s speeches frequently summon concrete, often heartbreaking, anecdotes to bring the spirit to life. One frequently cited story tells of Deng Yufen, a mother from Miyun County on the outskirts of Beijing, who sent her husband and five children to the front lines, all of whom perished. The tragedy, presented without embellishment, is meant to illustrate the depth of sacrifice and the collective resolve that allegedly underpinned the Chinese people’s resistance.
The official line is reinforced by a steady stream of scholarly and propagandistic publications. In 2015, on the 70th anniversary of the victory, the Chinese state media mounted a massive commemoration that underscored the war as the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti‑Fascist War.” Since then, journals such as Qiushi have featured articles with titles like “Carry forward the Great Anti‑Japanese War Spirit, Bravely March Towards the Bright Shore of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” echoing Xi’s own phrasing. These pieces tend to blend historical analysis with political exhortation, positioning the war’s legacy as a “pillars” (中流砥柱) of both the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy and the nation’s future.
At the policy level, the spirit has been woven into the educational fabric. The CCP has ordered the inclusion of the anti‑Japanese war narrative in the newly expanded “Grand Ideological and Political Courses,” a move meant to transmit “red genes” and the so‑called “invaluable spiritual wealth” of the wartime experience to younger generations. The aim, as officials put it, is not to stoke perpetual hatred of Japan but to use the memory of collective sacrifice as a motivational engine for overcoming contemporary challenges and achieving the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation.
Yet, even as the official discourse swells, the public’s organic response remains opaque. Searches of Chinese social platforms such as Weibo turn up little in the way of spontaneous commentary on the specific phrase “great spirit of resistance” as articulated by Xi. Most of the available material consists of state‑run news reports, academic papers and policy documents that reiterate the leadership’s talking points. Analysts note that any genuine debate about the war’s historiography—such as the lingering academic dispute between the “eight‑year war” (1937‑45) and the “fourteen‑year war” (1931‑45) interpretations—tends to be subsumed under the broader, sanctioned narrative that both perspectives are “complementary and unified” in service of the larger patriotic story.
The timing of the 2025 commemoration is no accident. By aligning the ceremony with the 80th anniversary, the party seeks to refresh the symbolic power of the war at a moment when China is navigating a complex mix of external pressures—from trade tensions to security competition—and internal anxieties about socioeconomic inequality. The repeated emphasis on the wartime spirit serves as a rallying cry, framing the country’s current challenges as a continuation of the struggle for survival and dignity that began in the 1930s.
In practice, the upcoming celebrations are expected to feature senior officials, military parades and a keynote address by Xi himself, likely reiterating his familiar triad of patriotism, integrity and heroism. Media outlets will broadcast the proceedings, while textbooks in elementary schools will begin a new chapter on the “great anti‑Japanese war spirit,” complete with guided readings of Xi’s speeches. The spectacle, scholars suggest, is designed to cement a collective memory that aligns personal sacrifice with the party’s long‑term political project.
While the official story is meticulously crafted, the broader global audience continues to receive a more limited picture. International observers note that the Chinese government’s focus on wartime heroism often downplays the darker aspects of the conflict, such as the complex role of collaborationist forces and the immense civilian suffering that transcended party lines. Moreover, the narrative’s heavy reliance on patriotism can make dissenting views appear unpatriotic, thereby narrowing the space for public discussion.
In short, Xi Jinping’s articulation of the “great spirit of resistance” is less a new historical discovery than a strategic revival of an established mythos. By anchoring contemporary governance, national education and future aspirations to the sacrifices of the 1930s and 1940s, the Chinese leadership hopes to forge a sense of continuity that legitimizes its present policies. The upcoming 80th‑anniversary events will likely be the most visible expression of that effort yet, a state‑orchestrated reminder that the ghosts of a shattered past are still called upon to guide the road ahead. Whether the Chinese public embraces, questions, or simply tolerates this reiteration remains to be seen, but the official message is unmistakable: the wartime spirit is the moral engine that will drive China toward its envisioned destiny.