Xi Jinping’s Ecological Civilization Drive

The first public surge of the ecological‑civilisation agenda appeared at the 18th Party Congress in 2013, when the Party’s report elevated to a core national priority. Xi’s visits that summer to Chongqing and Shandong underscored a paradoxical mantra: “great protection, not great development,” urging officials to safeguard the Yangtze River corridor while curbing unchecked expansion. That same year, the Party signalled a shift from reactive cleanup to preventive stewardship, a theme that would deepen over the next decade.

A watershed moment arrived in 2018 at the National Ecological Environmental Protection Conference, where “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” was formally enshrined. The conference, now a regular platform for the General Secretary’s speeches, has since drawn responses from a broad cross‑section of China’s bureaucracy and business community. Members of the environmental‑resources sector, for example, routinely submit proposals and social surveys that echo the leader’s call to build a “beautiful China.” Private‑sector figures such as Lin Fanru, chairman of Xiangyu Group, have publicly pledged to remember Xi’s entrustment, promising that private enterprises will play a decisive role in the nation’s green transition.

The practical outworking of Xi’s directives can be seen in an array of corporate and regional initiatives. China Railway Construction has repeatedly stressed its adherence to the General Secretary’s guidance on carbon peaking and neutrality, while China Communications Construction has rolled out flood‑control and disaster‑relief measures that align with Xi’s emphasis on resilient infrastructure. In the Yangtze basin, Xingfa Group faced a stark reminder of the new order when Xi called for the relocation of polluting plants, a a cascade of industrial upgrades along the river’s length. Even the Qingshan District Procuratorate in Hubei cited the General Secretary’s entrustment while cracking down on illegal solid‑waste dumping, showing how the message filters down to local law‑enforcement.

Geographically, the General Secretary’s focus has been both broad and pinpointed. In 2020, his inspection tour of Anhui spotlighted a comprehensive clean‑up of the Yangtze shoreline, setting a template for river‑bank rehabilitation. The following year, his remarks in Tibet reinforced “ecological protection first” for the plateau’s fragile ecosystems. At the Yellow River, Xi’s 2023 appeal to make the waterway a “river of happiness for the people” dovetailed with a push for intelligent management of national parks such as Wuyi Mountain, illustrating how high‑tech monitoring is being married to traditional conservation. Most recently, in May and July of 2025, Xi’s visits to Henan and Shanxi reiterated the need for sustained pollution prevention, strengthened ecological security barriers, and coordination across ministries to tackle “prominent environmental issues” that continue to challenge the nation.

Public sentiment seems to echo the official narrative. Social‑media platforms, especially Weibo, are awash with praise for the “Two Mountains” concept—lucid waters and lush mountains—as an enduring principle that has turned “cleaner skies, greener mountains and clearer rivers” into a tangible reality. Posts celebrating National Ecology Day, observed on August 15, 2025, frequently cite the General Secretary’s “instructions on ecological protection” and showcase community‑level clean‑up actions, underscoring a growing civic awareness of environmental stewardship.

The enduring relevance of Xi’s ecological mandate rests on its integration into China’s broader development strategy. By framing environmental health as a source of “golden mountains and silver rivers,” the leadership has sought to dissolve the false dichotomy between growth and green. This narrative is reinforced by policy tools such as ecological protection red lines, stricter pollutant standards and the promotion of “green productivity” as a new quality of productive forces. The 20th Party Congress in 2022 reiterated these themes, cementing ecological civilization as a pillar of the nation’s next stage of modernization.

For Western observers, the significance of the General Secretary’s repeated urging is twofold. First, it signals that China’s environmental agenda is not a peripheral fad but a central element of its political doctrine, with direct implications for global climate commitments, supply‑chain standards and cross‑border pollution. Second, the concrete actions—relocating heavy polluters from the Yangtze, upgrading flood‑control infrastructure, and mandating carbon‑neutral pathways for state‑owned enterprises—provide concrete data points that can be tracked and compared against the country’s pledges under the Paris Agreement.

As China marks its third National Ecology Day and continues to embed ecological considerations into the fabric of governance, industry and public life, the General Secretary’s entrustment remains a living directive. Whether it translates into measurable improvements in biodiversity, water quality or carbon emissions will be judged not only by the slogans that dominate official speeches but by the observable outcomes of the myriad initiatives it has inspired—from the boardrooms of private conglomerates to the rural riverbanks where local residents now plant reeds to anchor the banks of the “Mother River.” In the coming years, the world will be watching how this top‑down ecological vision reshapes the most populous nation’s relationship with its natural environment.